About your Search

20130201
20130228
Search Results 0 to 2 of about 3
industrialized city of the northeast. these were european first generations european who had no gun training. they got here and drafted to the army -- [inaudible conversations] people need to know and understand the firearms. that's when the nra was formed. when you get to today, it's interesting because that was urban, rural kind of division. that's the division. a lot of people don't have any familiarity in firearms. if you grew up in downtown anywhere where guns were banned and all of this whether it was gun crime -- is it illogical for you to think that these are bad rather than good? >> for -- [inaudible conversations] >> most of americans it's different. it is cultural. i talk about the cultural war which are id on call. it's also cultural in term of the upbringing and where you come from. i come from wisconsin, and when i was growing up, back in the old days you could take your shotgun -- [inaudible] you could get a card board case for your rifle at the check in counter. we could take our shotguns to school. that didn't happen in new york city. so that's part of the -- different cultu
of philadelphia, but in realty, if you can't cover the whole city and can't do a lot of things, that one s.w.a.t. team can never be decisive. that's where we found ourselves, that began the significant evolution. that's where we really began to change dramatically. >> right. in sew maul wrau -- somalia task force ranger was there before the big battle i wrote about and during that battle they launched six mission. the pace was intelligence gathering, finding targets and planning, operations, sometimes very quickly once that intelligence came together and launching a raid. describe how, what optempo means and exactly how that applied in iraq? >> that is very interesting, mark got it exactly right. a series of raids in mogadishu all happened a number about raids days apart. you get intel. make a decision. you set yourself criteria to launch. when those criteria come you launch but it is a pretty centralized and pretty deliberate process. when we got in iraq we were originally doing that and we would have this precise thing. what we found we were having effect, but very narrow effect, very sl
to september 11th there were no fewer than four significant attacks against the western interests in the city. i'd like to have you put the chart up there, and leave it up during the course of this hearing, because each member of here has a copy of this, and there's certain things that happened we all know. we know that on may 22nd the red cross was hit with an rpg. they left town. we know that on june 11th, the british ambassador's motorcade was attacked by an rpg. they left town. we know on april 10th, the united nations convoy was hit by an ied, and on june 6th the u.s. consulate was attacked with a bomb. and many, many other things and we didn't leave. while i understand the state department has primary responsibility for the protection of american diplomats rolled the world, also understand that the defense department plays an important supporting role to this effect. i suspect or witnesses to explain today why, given the clear indicators and warnings, thats to the united states interests in ben georgia si, and throughout the north africa, were growing, was the defense department not pla
Search Results 0 to 2 of about 3